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Kepler: Bankruptcy - The Creditor's Dilemma of Insider Guarantees - Levit

BANKRUPTCY-The Creditor's Dilemma of Insider
Guarantees. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp., 874
F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
V. N. Deprizio Construction Co., an Illinois corporation, operated
a construction business in the Chicago area.' Over the course of several years prior to its bankruptcy, the company borrowed money from
various lenders including Ingersoll Rand Financial Corporation, CIT
Corporation, and All Motive Equipment Company. 2 The debt to these
three creditors had been personally guaranteed by Richard, Robert,
and Edward Deprizio, all insiders of the firm. 3 On April 13, 1983, the
construction company filed a petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code).' The case was later converted
to a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7 of the Code. 5
On August 22, 1985, Louis W. Levit, the bankruptcy trustee, filed
a motion for declaratory judgment in the bankruptcy court for the
Northern District of Illinois seeking to avoid certain transfers. 6 In this
motion the trustee alleged that payments to Ingersoll Rand Financial
Corporation, CIT Corporation, and All Motive Equipment Company
made more than ninety days, but less than one year prior to the filing
of the bankruptcy, were voidable transfers under section 547(b) of the
Code.7 He argued that even though the payments were received by the
1. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186, 1187 (7th Cir. 1989).
2. Id.
3. Id. A "creditor" is defined as the "entity that has a claim against the debtor
that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor." 11
U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) (1988).
A "guaranty" is defined as the promise to answer for the payment of debt, in the
case where the person who is primarily liable for the debt fails to make such payment.
4 T. EISENBERG, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 17.03, at 17-5 (1986 & Cum. Supp. 1987).
An "insider" of a debtor corporation is defined as any of the following:
(i) director of the debtor;
(ii) officer of the debtor;
(iii) person in control of the debtor;
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) general partner of the debtor; or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the
debtor; 11 U.S.C. § 101(28)(B) (1988).
The debt owed to CIT Corporation was allegedly not guaranteed by an insider.
The court indicated that the record was void of detail concerning these guarantees,
and held that the matter should be resolved in the bankruptcy court. Levit, 874 F.2d
at 1191.
4. Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp. (In re V.N. Deprizio Const. Co.), 86
Bankr. 545, 556 (N.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.
1989) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988)).
5. In re V.N. Deprizio Const. Co., 86 Bankr. at 556.
6. Complaint To Avoid Transfers, Levit v. Melrose Park National Bank (In re
V.N. Deprizio Const. Co.), 58 Bankr. 478, 479 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (No. 83-B-04804).
A "transfer" is defined as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional,
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting With property or with an interest in
property .. " 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) (1988).
7. Levit v. Melrose Park National Bank (In re V.N. Deprizio Const. Co.), 58
Bankr. 478, 479 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1986), rev'd, 86 Bankr. 545 (N.D. II. 1988), aff'd in
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creditors they also benefited the insider guarantors. 8 The trustee further alleged that these transfers were recoverable from the three creditors pursuant to section 550(a) of the Code.9
The bankruptcy court denied the trustee's motion for declaratory
judgment.10 The court stated that a payment made on the debt created two separate transfers: one being received by the insider and the
other by the outside creditor.11 The court denied the trustee recovery
of the payments made more than ninety days prior to the bankruptcy
from the three creditors, because the transfers received did not meet
12
the avoiding requirement of section 547(b) as to the creditors. It
part, rev'd in part, 874 F.2d. 1186 (7th Cir. 1989).
Total payments consisted of:
Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp: $98,292;
CIT Corporation: $38,259;
All Motive Equipment Company: $ 6,062.
Complaint to Avoid Transfers, Levit v. Melrose Park National Bank (In re V.N.
Deprizio Const. Co.), 58 Bankr. 478 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (No. 83-B-04804).
The trustee sought avoidance of these transfers under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) which
states:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of filing of the
petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
This is section 547(b) as amended in 1984 and 1986. The version in force in 1983, when
this case began, applied the expanded avoidance period in section 547(b)(4)(B)(ii) to insiders only if the insider "had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time
of the transfer." The court in Levit found this qualification unimportant to the case. Levit,
874 F.2d at 1189.
8. In re V.N. Deprizio Const. Co., 58 Banki. at 479.
9. Id. Section 550(a) states:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer
is avoided under section ... 547, the trustee may recover, for the benefit
of the estate, the property transferred, or if the court so orders, the value
of such property, from(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988).
10. In re V.N. Deprizio Const. Co., 58 Bankr. at 481.
11. Id. at 480.
12. Id.
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held that the result sought by the trustee would be inequitable. 3
On appeal, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reversed the bankruptcy court's decision.", The district
court based its decision on a literal reading of the Code and held that
the transfers were voidable. 15 It further held that, based on a direct
application of section 550(a), the trustee could recover from the three
creditors not only the payments received within ninety days, but also
those received between ninety days and one year prior to the filing for
bankruptcy."' The court stated that, when Congress drafts an unambiguous and comprehensive statutory scheme, courts should be extremely hesitant in tampering with it by using "vague equitable powers."" This decision was appealed to the United States Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. 8
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the first circuit court to
rule on this issue, affirmed the district court's literal application of the
Code.' It held that the trustee acting under section 547(b) could
avoid transfers made within one year prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition to outside creditors when the payment produced a
benefit for an insider, including a guarantor.2" The court further held
that the trustee could recover these payments
not only from the in2
sider, but also from the outside creditor. '
This casenote will address the issue faced by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Financial Corp.. The issue is whether transfers made more than ninety days, but less than
one year, prior to the filing for bankruptcy to outside creditors on
debt guaranteed by an insider can be avoided and from whom such
transfers can be recovered.
BACKGROUND

The adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19782 and the
subsequent repeal of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act 3 materially changed
bankruptcy law."4 The preference laws were also modified.2" Changes
13. Id. at 481.
14. In re V.N. Deprizio Const. Co., 86 Bankr. at 556.

15. Id. at 550.
16. Id. at 553.
17. Id. at 552.
18. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1188.
19. Id. at 1201.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amend, at 11 U.S.C. §§ 100-1331 (1988)).
23. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1978).
24. Nutovic, The Bankruptcy Preference Laws: Interpreting Code Sections
547(c)(2), 550(a)(1), and 546(a)(1), 41 Bus. LAW., Nov. 1985, at 175.
25. "A preference is a transfer that enables a creditor to receive payment of a
greater percentage of his claim against the debtor than he would have received if the
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included the expansion of the preference period and the distinction
between insider and outside creditors. 6 The trustee's power to avoid
transfers is no longer limited to four months for all creditors. The
Code allows for the avoidance of payments to outside creditors made
within ninety days prior to the filing for bankruptcy.17 It also provides
that payments to insiders made one year prior to bankruptcy can be
avoided. 8
One of the most powerful arrows in the trustee's quiver is the
ability to avoid preferential transfers. The avoiding power is expressly
given to stop creditors from collecting from the financially distressed
debtor on the eve of bankruptcy. 29 Avoiding preferential transfers promotes the equality of distribution among creditors and encourages
reorganization."
The Code divides the avoidance and recovery of a transfer into
two distinct legal actions. This bifurcation determines if avoidance of
a transfer is appropriate, and, if so, from whom recovery is allowed.
Section 547(b) specifies that the trustee must first establish five requirements to avoid a transfer.3 ' Once a trustee succeeds in avoiding a
transfer under section 547(b), he/she must then turn to section 550 to
determine from whom recovery is possible. Under section 550(a)(1),
the trustee can recover from the initial transferee or the entity for
whose benefit the transfer was made.32
The following hypothetical will illustrate the difficulties the judiciary has faced in addressing this issue."3 Two years prior to filing for
bankruptcy a debtor corporation obtains an unsecured term loan from
a creditor requiring monthly payments.3 4 An insider of the debtor pertransfer had not been made and he had participated in the distribution of the assets of
the bankrupt estate." H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, 4 (1978) reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 6138.

26. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
27. Id.
28. Id.

29. Katzen, Deprizio and Bankruptcy Code Section 550: Extended Preference
Exposure Via Insider Guarantees,and Other Perils of Initial Transferee Liability, 45
Bus. LAW., Feb. 1990, at 512.
A "debtor" is defined as the "person or municipality concerning which a case
under this title has ... commenced." 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1988).
30. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, 4 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEws 5963, 6138.

31. See supra note 7.

32. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988). It should be noted that the trustee is entitled to
only a single recovery from either party under section 550(a). Id. at § 550(c).
33. This hypothetical is based on the example set forth by Pitts, Insider Guaranties and the Law of Preferences, 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 343, 344 (1981).
34. The term of the loan in the hypothetical is set at two years for a specific
reason. In Levit, the court stated that the ordinary course of business exception in
section 547(c)(2) would provide protection from an otherwise preferential debt. Levit,
874 F.2d at 1200. Arguably, the hypothetical loan and the subsequent payments would
be excluded from preference action by the ordinary course of business exception in
section 547(c)(2). However, assuming that a loan with a two year term is "long term",
it might be suggested that payments on long term debt would not fall under the excep-
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sonally guarantees the loan. Although insolvent during the entire year
preceding bankruptcy, debtor's payments on the antecedent debt are
kept current up to the filing."' After the filing, the bankruptcy court
concludes that the creditor received more than it would have under
Chapter 7 of the Code, absent the payments. The court also finds that
the creditor was not at any time prior to the filing an insider or acting
in concert with the insider.
The application of sections 547 and 550 to the hypothetical seems
straight forward. The final three monthly payments are clearly voidable preferences under section 547(b). These payments were made
within ninety days of the filing for bankruptcy ("the ordinary preference period"). However, an unsettled issue exists regarding the payments made to an outside creditor more than ninety days, but less
than one year, prior to the filing for bankruptcy ("the insider preference period").
The problem arises because payments made during the insider
preference period went to the outside creditor, but also benefited the
insider guarantoras a creditor." There is little disagreement among
commentators or courts that the trustee can recover transfers made
within the insider preference period from the insider.8 7 However,
there is a split of authority on whether transfers within this time period, avoided as to the insider, can be recovered from the outside
creditor.3 Put more simply, can the trustee under section 550(a) recover from the outside creditor payments made during the insider
preference period even though the preference is voidable only because
the required elements of section 547(b) are met by the insider?
Statutory Background
The statutory background of this issue evolves from section 60 of
the 1898 Bankruptcy Act and its use in creating sections 547 and 550.
tion of section 547(c)(2). Broome, Payments on Long-Term Debt as Voidable Preferences: The Impact of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments, DuE L.J. 78, 82 (1987).
There is significant controversy on this subject, but it is beyond the scope of this
casenote. The hypothetical will assume that payments on the debt will not be excluded
from avoidance by the exception in section 547(c)(2).
35. "Insolvent" with reference to an entity other than a partnership and a munici-

pality, is defined as when the sum of the entity's debt exceeds the sum of the fair
valuation of its property. 11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (1988).

36. A guarantor for the debtor will be a creditor under the Code because the guarantor holds a contingent claim against the debtor that becomes fixed when the guarantor pays the creditor whose claim was guaranteed. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRupTcY 1 547[1],
at 547-33 (L. King 15th ed. 1990) [hereinafter COLLIER]. It is also well established law
that payment on a guaranteed obligation benefits the guarantor. Nutovic, supra note
24 at 187. See also Seeley v. Church Bldgs. & Interiors, Inc. (In re Church Bldgs. &
Interiors), 14 Bankr. 128, 129 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981).
37. Note, The Interplay Between Sections 547(b) and 550 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 530, 531 (1989). See, e.g., In re Church Bldgs. & Interiors, 14
Bankr. at 129.

38. See infra notes 58, 63, & 70.
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Section 60(a) closely parallels section 547(b) with the exception that it
did not distinguish between insider and outside creditors.3 " Section
60(b) specified from whom a preference was recoverable. In its original form subsection 60(b) stated that if the person receiving or being
benefited by the preference had reasonable cause to believe that it
was intended to be given as a preference then recovery was possible
from such person.'0 Therefore, recovery was only possible from "such
person" whose "reasonable cause to believe" made the preference
voidable.'
However, in 1938, Congress amended the original version. Section
60(b) in its amended form stated that a preference may be avoided if
the creditor receiving or benefiting from the preference had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent, and that recovery
could come from any person who had received or converted such
property.'
The 1938 amendment created uncertainty in the statute by the
use of the words "any person." Based on the language of the 1938
version it would seem conceivable to allow recovery from any creditor
even if they had not met the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement. That is, recovery could come from any creditor who had received a transfer so long as another person also receiving the transfer
(e.g., an insider) had met the "reasonable cause to believe" standard.
The judiciary had no difficulty in allowing recovery from an insider satisfying the "reasonable cause to believe" standard.43 However,
courts consistently refused to allow the trustee to recover from a creditor when the transfer constituted a preference as to another creditor
that had met the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement." If a
creditor lacked the "reasonable cause to believe," recovery was not
possible from such creditor. One author suggests that courts were un39. The 1938 version of subsection 60(a) in relevant part stated:
(a) A preference is a transfer... of any property of a debtor to or for the
benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or
suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before
the filing... of the petition in bankruptcy ....
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 52 Stat. 840, 869 (1938) (repealed 1978).
40. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544, 562 (1898) (repealed 1978).
41. Pitts, supra note 33, at 350.
42. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 52 Stat. 840, 870 (1938) (repealed 1978). "Any
such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor receiving it or to be
benefited thereby . . . [had] reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent.
Where the preference is voidable, the trustee may recover the property ... from any

person who has received or converted such property .... " Id.

43. See, e.g., Cooper Petroleum Co. v. Hart, 379 F.2d 777, 780 (5th Cir. 1967);
Fenold v. Green, 175 F.2d 247, 249 (2d Cir. 1949); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 60.17, at
835-40 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1977).
44. Pitts, supra note 33, at 350-51. This principle was recognized in the representative case of Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438 (1917). However, Pitts suggests that the only
authority supporting the rule, that the recipient who lacks "reasonable cause to be-

lieve" is precluded from recovery, is found in unsupported statements in secondary
sources. Pitts supra note 33, at 35 at 351 n.38.
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willing to allow recovery from the creditor that lacked the "reasonable
cause to believe"
in such a situation due to the pre-1938 language of
4
section 60(b).

5

The 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
eliminated the "reasonable cause to believe" provision.6 This provision was criticized for being difficult to prove and for causing inconsistent results among the courts.4 7 Bills introduced in Congress in 1977
considered the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement to be "the
most 4 litigated question under the preference provision of the 1898
Act."

In addition to eliminating the "reasonable cause to believe" prerequisite, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 also recognized the difference between insider and outside creditors." Under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act and its amendments, the preference period was four
months regardless of the relationship of the creditor to the debtor.5 0
The Code, however, makes the distinction to protect the estate from
improper insider activities prior to bankruptcy which might hinder reorganization. The Code places insiders in a special class and expands
the preference period for this group to one year.5 1
The changes reflected in the Code improved and modernized
bankruptcy law. One commentator has described the draftsmanship of
the Code as "maddeningly precise" and a "commitment to clarity and
precision."'" Nonetheless, the elimination of the "reasonable cause to
believe" provision and the expansion of the preference period for insiders created an uncertainty with respect to the treatment of payments on insider guaranteed debt to outside creditors within the insider preference period.
Judicial Background
Judicial authority is definitively split regarding the recoverability
of a transfer made during the insider preference period from an
outside creditor if it is voidable only because of the insider." Three
theories have evolved. Two of the theories would deny recovery from
the outside creditor for transfers made within the insider preference
period. These are referred to as the equitable approach and the two45. Pitts, supra note 33, at 349. Pitts performs a more complete and thorough
analysis of the development of section. 60 and sections 547 & 550.
46. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 333
(1984).
47. Broome, supra note 34, at 94.

48. Id.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1988).

50. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 60(a), 52 Stat. 869 (1938) (repealed 1978).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1988).
52. Pitts, supra note 33, at 343, 353.

53. See infra notes 58, 63, & 70.
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transfers approach. The third theory, the literal reading approach,
would allow recovery under section 550 from the outside creditor. 55
The equitable approach has been adopted by the majority of
courts. 56 The proponents of the equitable approach argue that allowing recovery from the outside creditor for a transfer in the insider
preference period is inequitable. The contention is that by allowing
such recovery the outside creditor is unfairly penalized simply because
it has sought to acquire a guarantor.17 Courts following this approach
have exercised their equitable powers to prevent this result.'
The bankruptcy court in In re Church Buildings and Interiors,
Inc. was the first to adopt the equitable approach.59 This court based
its holding on the treatment of section 550(a) in Collier on Bankruptcy."0 Collier on Bankruptcy suggests that even though a literal
application of section 550(a) would permit recovery of payments made
within the insider preference period from a creditor holding an insider
guaranty, the bankruptcy court should use its discretion to avoid such
an inequitable result. This passage from Collier is the cornerstone
upon which the equitable theory lies and the basis of many courts'
decisions.62
Courts have also applied the two-transfers approach in finding
that the trustee cannot recover from the outside creditor for those
payments made within the insider preference period. Two bankruptcy
courts have held this novel theory to be persuasive.6 3
The two-transfers theory rests on the view that a single payment
on debt guaranteed by an insider is effectively two transfers: the first
transfer is payment from the debtor to the creditor for the primary
indebtedness; and the second transfer is to the guarantors in satisfac54. Note, supra note 37, at 530.
55. Id.
56. Katzen, supra note 29, at 515.
57. Schmitt v. Equibank (In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc.) 34 Bankr. 888, 894
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983).
58. Block v. Texas Commerce Bank, N.A. (In re Midwestern Companies, Inc.), 96
Bankr. 224, 228 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988), aff'd, 102 Bankr. 169, 173 (W.D. Mo. 1989);
In re R.A. Beck Builder, Inc., 34 Bankr. at 894; Bakst v. Schilling (In re Cove Patio
Corp.), 19 Bankr. 843, 844 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re Ducilli Formal Wear, 8 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1180 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
59. In re Church Bldgs. & Interiors, Inc., 14 Bankr. at 131.

60. Id.

61. 4 CoLLINS, supra note 36, 550.02, at 550-7. "The trustee can theoretically
recover from both the initial transferee ... as well as from any entity for whose benefit
In some circumstances, a literal application of section
the transfer was made ....

550(a) would permit the trustee to recover from a party who is innocent of wrongdoing
and deserves protection. In such circumstances the bankruptcy court should exercise
its discretion to use its equitable powers [under section 105(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1481] to
prevent an inequitable result." Id.

62. See supra note 58.

63. Goldberger v. Davis Jay Corregated Box Corp. (In re Mercon Industries, Inc.),
37 Bankr. 549, 552 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); In re V.N. Deprizio Const. Co., 58 Bankr.

at 480.
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tion of their contingent liability." The court in In re Mercon Industries, Inc. stated that the two transfers were independent from each
other and not derivative. 0
The In re Mercon Industries, Inc. court held that section 550(a)
did not act to expand the scope of section 547(b). 66 It noted that the
language of the Code suggests that only preferences arising under section 547(b) could be applied to section 550(a). 67 The court concluded
that because of the distinction between the two transfers, an outside
creditor could not be liable for transfers made within the insider preference period.68 The court supported this holding by stating that the
trustee could not meet
the requirements of section 547(b)(4)(B) as to
69
the outside creditor.
The third theory followed by courts, including the Tenth Circuit,
is based on a literal reading of sections 547(b) and 550(a), and allows
recovery from the outside creditor for payments made within the insider preference period. 70 The literal reading approach relies on the
language of section 550(a)(1) which allows recovery either from "the
initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such
transfer was made." '
The In re Big Three Transportation,Inc. court was the first to
apply the literal reading approach. 2 In Big Three Transportation,
Inc. the court acknowledged the equitable approach, but refused to
overlook the unambiguous language
of section 550 and allowed recov73
ery from the outside creditor.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

The United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
decision of the district court.7 " The appellate court held that pay64. In re Mercon Industries, Inc., 37 Bankr. at 552.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Lowrey v. First Nat'l Bank of Bethany (In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc.), 97
Bankr. 77, 80 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1988), aff'd, 892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1990); Coastal
Petroleum Corp. v. Union Bank & Trust Co. (In re Coastal Petroleum Corp.), 91
Bankr. 35, 38 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988); In re V.N. Deprizio, 86 Bankr. at 552; Mixon v.
Mid-Continent Sys., Inc. (In re Big Three Tranp.), 41 Bankr. 16, 20 (Bankr. W.D.
Ark. 1983).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (1988).
72. In re Big Three Transp., 41 Bankr. at 20.

73. Id.
74. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1201. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court. The appellate court
reversed the lower court ruling regarding certain payments which were made to pension and welfare funds. However, it affirmed the district court decision pertaining to
the outside creditor holding debt guaranteed by the insiders which is the issue being
considered in this casenote. Id.
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ments from Deprizio Construction Co. to Ingersoll Rand Financial
Corp. and CIT Corp. within the insider preference period on debt
guaranteed by insiders were voidable.7 5 It further78held that the trustee
could recover the transfers from these creditors.
Levit, the trustee, requested that the extended one year recovery
period be applied to the outside creditors, based upon the direct and
unambiguous language of sections 547 and 550.7 Levit contended that
a payment made to a creditor within the insider preference period is
because
"for the benefit of the guarantor" under section 547(b)(1),
78
each reduction in debt reduces the guarantor's exposure.
The trustee also sought recovery from the outside creditors under
section 550(a) .7 Levit stated that the statute was undeniably clear "as
to the identity of those potentially liable."' 0 He argued that recovery
was possible from either "the initial transferee" or "the entity for
whose benefit such transfer was made." 81
The creditors argued that they should not be liable for recovery
of the payments received within the insider preference period."2 They
contended that "[tlhe ... Code was enacted against a background of
well-established . . . law holding that a creditor cannot be liable for a
preference unless all the elements of a preference are established as to
that creditor.""a They maintained that the principles under the 1898
Bankruptcy Act should continue to apply under the Code unless there
is clear evidence of congressional intent to change them."
The creditors also argued for the two-transfers approach adopted
by the bankruptcy court in the initial proceeding. They contended
that the qualifying language in section 550(a) which states "to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section . . . 547" could not be
ignored."" They asserted that this qualification would allow recovery
only "to the extent that" the trustee first satisfies the requirements of
section 547 as to that creditor. 86 From this notion the creditors then
argued that a single payment constituted two distinct transfers. 7 The
creditors stated that under the two-transfers theory the separate
75. Id. The payments made to All Motive Equipment Co. were not addressed by

the court. This creditor's name does not appear in the briefs submitted for appeal or in
any record of the appellate court.

76. Id. at 1200.
77. Appellee's Brief at 6, Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th
Cir. 1989) (Nos. 88-3091, 88-3092, 88-3093) (hereinafter Appellee's Brief].

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Levit, 874 F.2d at 1190.
Id. at 1194.
Appellee's Brief, supra note 77, at 9.
Id.
Joint Brief of Appellants at 6, Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d

1186 (7th Cir. 1989) (Nos. 88-3091, 88-3092, 88-3093) [hereinafter Joint Brief].

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

10.
11.
21 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988)).
21.
24.
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transfer to themselves failed to be avoided by section 547(b)(4) and
was therefore not recoverable."8
The court unanimously rejected the arguments of the creditors
and adopted the the literal reading approach. 6 ' The Seventh Circuit
court agreed with the district court in finding that Congress had created an "unambiguous comprehensive statutory scheme" to allow recovery from the outside creditors for payments made within the insider preference period.'"
The court's analysis began by pointing out that the avoiding
power of the trustee is essential for a collective proceeding for the determination and payments of debts.'" The opinion noted that an extension of the recovery period to outside creditors for payments made
within the insider preference period would prevent last minute 2asset
grabbing which would reduce the aggregate value of the estate.
The court then noted the practical problems of insiders guaranteeing company debt and the unique position of an outside creditor
with debt guaranteed by insiders.'" It suggested that insiders, in serving personal interests, could reduce their own contingent liability by
"inducing the firm to pay the guaranteed loans preferentially.""
After indicating the distinctive position of the creditor with the
insider guaranty, the court held that transfers should be viewed from
the payer's point of view and not from the recipient's.' Based on this
perception the court rejected the two-transfers theory. 9 It followed
the district court ruling that this theory equated transfer with benefit
received, rather than with payments made. The court explained that
avoidability should be 7viewed as "an attribute of the transfer rather
than of the creditor."'
The court then addressed the creditors' argument that well-established pre-Code judicial principles could not be ignored. It stated that
the Code represented a "wholesale change" to the text and structure
of the bankruptcy laws.9' The court rejected the creditors' argument
by stating that a silent legislative history should not be construed to
allow existing practices to continue unchanged."
88. Id. at 23.
89. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1196, 1200.
90. Id. at 1200. The "unambiguous comprehensive statutory scheme" language appears at: In re V.N. Deprizio Const. Co., 86 Bankr. at 552.
91. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1194.
92. Id. (citing Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STA. L. REv. 725,
727-31, 756-68 (1984)).
93. Id. at 1194.
94. Id. at 1195.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1196.

99. Id. The court relied on the decision of Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488
U.S. 105, 115 (1988). In Pittston, the United States Supreme Court held that "[ilt
is
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Although not specifically argued by the creditors, the court also
rejected the equitable approach.10 0 It held that the result of its decision would not be inequitable to lenders, but would simply result in
an adjustment of credit terms in the market.1"' The court noted that
its result would also cause creditors to more closely monitor debtors. 102 The decision stated that it would not be inequitable for a creditor to return payments made in the insider preference period if the
creditor "may have been favored only because payment reduced insid-

ers' exposure ....

"1103

ANALYSIS

The court's decision to allow recovery from the outside creditors
for payments made within the insider preference period is analytically
flawed. The equitable theory, and not the literal reading theory
adopted by the court, should be applied to this issue. The equitable
theory's result is more satisfactory than the literal reading approach
when three important arguments are considered. First, in light of the
statutory construction of the Code, the equitable approach more correctly supports a fundamental goal of bankruptcy-equality of distribution among creditors. Second, the literal reading theory fails to consider the pre-Code treatment of the issue. Third, the equitable theory,
unlike the literal reading approach, does not change preference policy
in a manner which thereby negatively impacts the credit market.
While this decision has certain positive ramifications on debtor-creditor relationships regarding guarantees, its overall impact on bankruptcy law is undesirable.
The Code and Equality of Distribution Among the Creditors
The preference power of the trustee facilitates an established goal
in bankruptcy. The goal is an equal distribution of payment to the
creditors of the debtor. 1 " Section 547(b) of the Code is the modernnot the law that a statute can have no effects which are not explicitly mentioned in its
legislative history."
In order to support its argument that pre-Code practices were not helpful in this
situation the court specifically distinguished its holding from Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36, 44-47 (1986), and Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986).

100. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1197. The court had previously rebuffed equity arguments
in Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 894 (7th Cir. 1988).
101. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1198. The court hypothesized that the cost and availability

of credit would change depending on how the extended preference period to outside
creditors was viewed. It suggested that if the extended period was thought to facilitate
the collective debt-adjustment of bankruptcy then credit would become available on
better terms. Conversely, the court stated that if the longer period was considered to

be undesirable then creditors would charge higher rates of interest. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.

104. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd Seas. 1, 177 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6138.

CODE CONG.
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ized preference provision designed to achieve this objective. 05 By
making a clear distinction between insider and outside creditors with
respect to the avoidance of transfers, subsection 547(b)(4) acts to support the goal.' This subsection assists in maintaining a level playing
field for creditors, and protects the estate from abusive insider transactions. The distinction had no predecessor in the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, and creates two separate classes of creditors which indicates
that a insider's liability is exclusive from the outside creditor. 0 7
Admittedly, the literal reading approach would be the ultimate
promoter of equality. Under this theory, allowing recovery of payments made within the insider preference period from outside creditors would increase the value of the estate for greater distribution to
other creditors. However, in attempting to achieve this goal, it circumvents the important distinction between insider and outside creditors.
Allowing the trustee to pursue outside creditors for such payments
tilts the playing field and pushes these creditors into a class established exclusively for insiders. No provision in the Code allows the
outside creditor to be identified so fully with the insider. 0 8
By seeking to achieve ultimate parity between creditors, the literal reading approach violates the standard rules of statutory construction by eliminating this distinction. 0 9 In interpreting statutes a
court should avoid an interpretation which rescinds all or part of another statute. 110 By its decision the court places the outside creditor in
the same class as the insider which acts to rescind section 547(b)(4).
Application of section 550(a) is also dependent upon the distinction between the insider and outside creditors. Recovery under section
550(a) is limited "to the extent the transfer is avoided under section.
. 547.""' Subsections 547(b)(1) and (b)(4) state that the trustee may
avoid a transfer to or for the benefit of a creditor made between
ninety days and one year before the filing, if such creditor was an
insider." 2 Therefore, recovery under section 550(a) should only be allowed from a creditor to the extent the transfer is avoided under section 547(b) as to such creditor.
In evaluating the preference action the court does not focus on
the creditor, but instead on the transfer itself. The literal reading approach allows recovery regardless of as to which creditor the transfer
was avoided under section 547(b)(4). This theory, by ignoring the distinction between the insider and outside creditor, imposes preference
105. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
106. Id. § 547(b)(4).

107. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 60(a), 52 Stat. 869 (1938) (repealed 1978).
108. In re Midwestern Cos., 96 Bankr. at 228.
109. See generally 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. §§ 51.01-51.03 (4th ed.

1984 & Cum. Supp. 1989).

110. In re Midwestern Cos., 96 Bankr. at 225.

111. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988).
112. Id. § 547(b)(1), (b)(4).
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liability for payments received within the insider preference period on
a non-preferred creditor for that time period.
The equitable approach has been criticized for ignoring the clear
and unambiguous language of the Code. However, by maintaining the
distinction in section 547(b)(4), and thereby assuring an acceptable
application of section 550(a), this theory arguably interprets these sections with precision. Nonetheless, despite this distinction, and the
long recognition by other courts that a preference action is a creature
of equity, this court rejected the equitable theory.1 1 3 Dismissing this
approach, the court quoted a ruling from the United States Supreme
Court which stated that "whatever equitable powers remain in the
bankruptcy court must and can only be exercised within the confines
of the statute."'"
A court denying recovery of payments made during the insider
preference period from the outside creditor is applying its equitable
powers within the confines of the Code. By holding that recovery from
such creditor is inequitable, a court is attempting to promote equality
of distribution by maintaining the distinction between the insider and
outside creditor clearly specified in the Code. Such an effort to enforce
the provisions of the Code is an action within the statutory confines.
Both the literal reading and the equitable theories attempt to
support the goal of equal distribution between creditors. However,
this objective is more properly supported by the equitable theory,
when the goal is considered in light of its application to sections 547
and 550.
The Pre-Code Treatment of the Recovery of Transfers
The pre-Code practice with respect to the recovery of payments
received by a creditor was to limit recovery only from those to whom
the transfer represented a preference. 115 The legislative history is silent with regards to congressional intent concerning this practice. 11 6
Because congressional intent is not evident in the legislative history,
the pre-Code handling of this issue becomes an important principle in
evaluating the applications of the equitable and literal reading
theories.
Legislative silence supports the contention that the pre-Code
treatment of this issue should continue through the application of the
equitable approach. The literal reading approach results in an out113. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1197. The court in In re Midwestern Companies, noted
that preference action has long been a creature of equity. In re Midwestern Cos., 96
Bankr. at 225.
114. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1197 (citing Norwest Bank v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988)).
115. See supra note 44.

116. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1196. The court noted that the legislative history of sections 547(b) and 550(a) is relatively silent and not helpful in drawing a conclusion of
congressional intent. Id.
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come which is contradictory to the judicial handling this matter received prior to the enactment of the Code. Arguably, if Congress had
its intent
desired to amend this long standing pre-Code practice,
17
would be clearly evident in the legislative history.'
The court dismissed the pre-Code treatment of this issue and
held, "[w]hen Congress makes wholesale changes in the text and
structure of the law, it is fatuous to pretend that a silent legislative
history means existing practices should continue unchanged."" This
dismissal should be considered in light of the changes to the preference laws referred to by the court.
The "wholesale changes" perceived by the court related to the
separate legal actions of avoidance of a transfer and its subsequent

recovery.' 19 The court, in dismissing the prior judicial treatment,
stated that such a structural change had no antecedents in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.120

Arguably, however, the bifurcation of avoidance and recovery existed in section 60(b) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Section 60(b)
stated in relevant part that "[w]here the preference is voidable, the
trustee may recover the property ... from any person who has received . .. such property."1 2' Admittedly, in a manner less exacting

than the Code, this phrase of section 60(b) provides for the segregation of avoidance and recovery. Therefore, with respect to this bifurcation, it can be argued that the Code does not represent such "wholesale changes."
Since the legislative intent is silent regarding the pre-Code treatment of this issue, and the changes to the Code are not entirely
"wholesale," a court should rely on the historical antecedents. The equitable approach maintains a consistent application of the pre-Code
treatment of this issue, and is supported by the Supreme Court's decision of Kelly v. Robinson.' 2' In Kelly the court held, "[wie decline to
hold that the new Bankruptcy Code silently abrogated another exception created by courts construing the [Bankruptcy Act of 18981. ''12s
117. When Congress resolves to amend or ratify existing practices such determination will be explicitly stated in the legislative history. Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 266 (1979).
The legislative history of the Code has numerous examples of express overulings

or affirmations of judicial decisions. An example is the legislative history on 11 U.S.C.
§ 541 (1988). H.R. Rep. No. 596, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, 367 (1978) reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6323.
118. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1196.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 60(b), 52 Stat. 840, 869 (1938) (repealed 1978).

122. 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
123. Id. at 47.
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Preference Policy and the Effect on the Credit Market
By adopting the literal reading approach, the court's holding impacts preference policy in a manner which could result in undesirable
effects to the credit markets. The literal reading theory creates an uncertainty for creditors making lending decisions. This uncertainty
could result in a decrease in the availability of credit to borrowers.
The court's holding has an adverse effect on preference policy by
providing the trustee with an extension of power greater than what
Congress intended. Congressional intent was to give the trustee the
avoiding powers to assure a cooperative proceeding in the payments of
debts. 12 4 The objective is to allow the trustee to prevent last minute
dismemberment of the estate or insider activity which could prevent
reorganization, but "leave undisturbed normal financial relations."'' 5
Policy, therefore, requires some limitation to the trustee's avoidance powers to protect ordinary business transactions and prevent
complete uncertainty to creditors. The focus should be on the nature
of the relationship of the creditor to the insider. Undoubtedly, a creditor acting in concert with an insider or receiving payment only because it holds an insider guaranty is not acting within "normal financial relations." However, when an outside creditor with the insider
guaranty is not receiving special treatment, forcing it to return such
payments is not within the powers of the trustee. Theoretically, if the
outside creditor is precluded from recovery, then the trustee can look
to the insider for repayment of those transfers made within the insider preference period.1"
The court's decision, by increasing the preference power of the
trustee, could effect the availability of credit. There is no empirical
evidence to support this contention, but this holding will arguably effect some credit markets in an adverse manner. The court recognizes
the possible impact of its decision on the credit market, but views it
primarily from the standpoint of the creditor. 27 The court did not
fully consider the potential adverse effect its ruling would have on
marginal borrowers seeking credit.
To cope with the risk of being forced to return payments received
within the insider preference period, the creditors might seek other
avenues of protection. The possible alternatives include a higher rate
of interest or greater collateral requirements. These different forms of
protection will effect the availability of credit to a borrower. The in124. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2nd Seas. 1, 177 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6138.
125. Id. at 373, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5963, 6329.

126. Recovery under section 550(a) would be possible to the extent the transfer
was avoided as to the insider. However, it is acknowledged that in a closely held corporation the insider may possibly be unavailable for recovery once the debtor files for
bankruptcy.
127. Levit, 874 F.2d at 1195. See supra note 101.
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creased rate of interest and additional collateral requirements could
preclude some borrowers from credit. Arguably, such a restriction on
credit was not within congressional intent in the passage of the Code.
The equitable approach would maintain the powers of the trustee
at such a level to prevent dismemberment of the estate. Furthermore,
this theory would not act to disrupt the use of guarantees in normal
financial relations or adversely impact the availability of credit.
Despite the stated problems, the holding of the court does provide specific beneficial consequences to debtor-creditor relationships
with respect to insider guarantees. The creditor holding an insider
guaranty maintains a hybrid identity to other creditors.' 28 In some instances the guarantors' assets are inadequate to provide meaningful
security to the borrowing. The creditor, may as a matter of economic
and psychological reality, take the guaranty not as additional security,
but for greater indirect control over the debtor. 12 9 This type of action
is not within "normal financial relations" and gives such a creditor a
considerable advantage over other creditors.
The court's decision could act to prevent creditors from taking
guarantees solely for the purpose of obtaining additional control over
the debtor. This ruling will encourage the creditor to obtain a guaranty only for additional security when the guarantor is financially secure and provides an alternative source of repayment. However, the
weight of these favorable aspects of the literal reading approach cannot justify the decision of the court. This ruling has significant adverse consequences on: the statutory construction of the Code in promoting a fundamental goal in bankruptcy; the pre-Code judicial
treatment; and preference policy as it effects the credit markets.
CONCLUSION

The court adopts a mechanical application of the Code which creates an undesirable result. This decision provides the bankruptcy
trustee with previously unavailable powers. The literal reading approach condones this increase in power, but does so capriciously in
light of the statutory construction of the Code, the pre-Code judicial
practice, and the changes to preference policy which impact the credit
markets.
The equitable approach provides a more compelling result. This
theory supports the goal of equality of distribution among creditors
without dismissing the distinction between the insider and outside
creditors specified in the Code. Furthermore, this approach conforms
with the pre-Code treatment of this issue which becomes relevant after considering the silent legislative history and "changes" in the
128. Pitts, supra note 33, at 354.
129. Nutovic, supra note 24, at 196.
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Code. Finally, the equitable theory does not adversely effect preference policy in a manner which could preclude certain borrowers from
the credit market.
The court's decision is based on what it interprets to be a clear
and unambiguous statute. However, this analysis shows that the clarity of the statute diminishes with the application of the different theories. Therefore, it is important for Congress to amend this statute and
specify its intent. Nonetheless, until such time or until the issue is
resolved by the Supreme Court, bankruptcy trustees will be testing
the limits of the expanded powers granted by this court. Unfortunately this testing will be performed to the detriment of the bankruptcy preference action.
COURTNEY
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